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Aristotle on Hybris and Injustice* 
Douglas Cairns 
 
The argument of this chapter is (first) that hybris, as defined and discussed in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, is or implies a defect of character, i.e. a vice, because the Rhetoric’s account 
presupposes the developed framework used in the ethical treatises to categorize such things. 
Second, I shall argue that this vice is a form of the “particular injustice” that is discussed in 
Nicomachean Ethics Book 5 and that this specific variety of particular injustice involves a 
way of going wrong about honour, in fact is a form of greed or acquisitiveness with regard to 
honour. This (I shall argue) reflects Aristotle’s view of honour as an important non-material 
commodity that can be fairly or unfairly distributed, justly or unjustly pursued. Accordingly, 
this view of hybris as a kind of injustice, a variety of pleonexia, needs to be seen in the 
context of the role of timê in Aristotle’s accounts of justice and equality in his ethics and 
politics more generally. 
 
1. Hybris is (or involves) a form of vice 
Aristotle’s account of hybris in the Rhetoric (2.2, 1378b14–15, 1378b23–31) falls within his 
discussion of the pathos of anger, and more specifically of its cause, oligôria, of which hybris 
is one of the three kinds (1378b14–15). This statement is backed by a definition of hybris: 
“For hybris is doing and saying things at which the victim incurs aischynê, not in order that 
the agent should obtain anything other than the performance of the act, but in order to please 
himself” (1378b23–25).1 Hybris, we are then told, requires the initiation of harm, and the 
pleasure of hybris lies in the thought of one’s own superiority (b25–30). As I argued long 
ago, in response to Fisher’s insistence that hybris denotes either a way of treating others or at 
most an intention to treat others in a certain way,2 Aristotle regards the motivation that is 
necessary for hybris not merely as a wish to bring about a certain state of affairs or to affect a 
patient in a particular way, but also as the desire to please oneself by demonstrating one’s 
own superiority. A victim is certainly required; but so are a subjective disposition, a view of 
oneself, and a motive that is ultimately self-referential. 
It is, of course, important that Aristotle defines hybris in terms of its actualization in 
word and deed (a point to which we shall return). But it is clearly the motive that matters – as 
Aristotle himself makes clear at 1374a13–15: not every case of striking is a case of hybris, 
but only when one strikes for a reason, such as dishonouring the other person or pleasing 
oneself.3 The intention to dishonour the other party and the intention to obtain the pleasure of 
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feeling or appearing superior are complementary and intrinsically linked. This is a way of 
treating others which at the same time expresses a subjective attitude both towards others and 
towards oneself. Already it seems to be about the balance between one’s own timê and that of 
others. 
These last remarks on hybris, which come at the end of Book 1 and before Book 2’s 
definition of the concept, belong in the context of a discussion of the forensic branch of oratory, 
which is concerned with acts involving an individual or a community as victim. Hybris is thus 
discussed not only as a cause of anger, but also as a kind of injustice. Accordingly, Aristotle 
discusses the motives, conditions, and circumstances of injustice, and gives a short account of 
what injustice, the subject-matter of forensic oratory, consists in. At 1.13, 1373b33–1374a15, 
his point is that any ascription of injustice to an agent depends on an assessment of his 
motivation; a bare description of an action, in external terms, is insufficient. Accordingly, some 
admit that they took but deny that they stole, or admit that they struck but deny that they 
committed hybris, and so on (1373b38–1374a6). These are disputes about what it is to be unjust 
or wicked and the opposite, and therefore about prohairesis, for wickedness and wrongdoing 
lie in the prohairesis, and terms such as hybris and klopê connote prohairesis (1374a6-13).4 
Prohairesis is a technical term that is important in both ethical treatises (and the Magna 
Moralia) in the discussion of the various states of character that are classified as virtues or 
vices.5 It is discussed in particular detail, however, in Nicomachean Ethics Book 3 (chapters 
2–3) and in Book 6 (chapter 2), as well as in the corresponding sections of the Eudemian Ethics 
and Magna Moralia, where these exist (EE 2.10–11, MM 17–19). From these and other 
passages we learn that all actions that result from prohairesis are voluntary, but not all 
voluntary actions result from prohairesis (EN 1112a14–15, 1135b8–11, EE 1223b38–1224a7, 
1226b34–36); and we learn that prohairesis follows (actual or implicit) deliberation in so far 
as it is a deliberative desire to perform actions which contribute to the ends set by the rational 
desire for the good.6 Prohairesis therefore requires a grasp of the end of one’s conduct, and 
this grasp is supplied by a person’s developed and settled state of character (hexis), whether 
virtuous or vicious. This means that in order for a prohairesis to be good, the agent must 
possess excellence of character, and, by the same token, excellence of character requires the 
exercise of prohairesis (the choice of the specific moral action for its own sake in the light of 
the person’s overall conception of the end). It is in the prohairesis that we see virtue or vice, 
and the praise and blame that the presence or absence of virtue rightly attracts respond not to 
the act but to the prohairesis.7 
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Certain aspects of this picture are particularly relevant to the account of hybris in 
Rhetoric 1.13 and 2.2. First, the Rhetoric agrees with the Ethics that prohairesis is the mark of 
virtue or vice: “Wickedness and wrongdoing [mochthêria and to adikein] lie in the prohairesis, 
and such terms (e.g. hybris and theft) connote the prohairesis” (ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ 
μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν, οἷον 
ὕβρις καὶ κλοπή, 1374a11–13). Second, hybris was defined as gratuitous insult, motivated by 
a desire not to achieve any ulterior purpose, but to obtain the intrinsic pleasure of demonstrating 
one’s own superiority through the dishonouring of another (1378b23–8; cf. 1374a13–15). 
Hybris is explicitly said to be a kind of action performed for its own sake, one which depends 
on prohairesis.  
The reference to prohairesis at Rhetoric 1374a11–13 clearly presupposes the technical 
sense of that term. We see this from the context in which it occurs, because the entire discussion 
of adikia in Rhetoric 1.10–13 is clearly related to the account of justice and injustice in 
Nicomachean Ethics 5.8 Accordingly, to adikein is defined as voluntary injury in contravention 
of the law (ἔστω δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον, 1368b6–7); the criteria of 
the voluntary (knowledge and the absence of duress) are rehearsed (ἑκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα 
εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, b9–10, as at EN 5.8, 1135a15–b8); and voluntary action is 
distinguished from action on prohairesis (ὅσα μὲν οὖν εἰδότες, οὐ πάντα προαιρούμενοι, ὅσα 
δὲ προαιρούμενοι, εἰδότες ἅπαντα, b10–12, as at EN 5.8, 1135b8–11).  
Injustice in the fullest sense exists when the agent acts on prohairesis, and this is a sign 
of the possession of a vicious hexis (1374a9–13; cf. 1374b13–16). But acts of injustice can also 
be committed by those who do not possess this hexis, for example by those who act in anger 
(1373b33–8); and acts that harm others can be committed unintentionally, through ignorance 
of some relevant particular, or by pure accident (1374b4–10):  
ἐφ’ οἷς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῆ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ 
ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦν, μηδὲ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀτυχήματα· [ἔστιν] 
ἀτυχήματα μὲν <γὰρ> ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἁμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ 
παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τέ 
ἐστιν· τὰ γὰρ δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας. 
For those actions which should be excused are cases for epieikeia; errors 
[hamartêmata], unjust acts [adikêmata] are not to be assessed on an equal basis, nor 
are errors and misadventures [atychêmata]. Misadventures are all those things that are 
unexpected and do not arise from vice; errors are those that are not unexpected, yet do 
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not arise from vice; while unjust acts are those that are both expected and caused by 
vice, for acts committed because of desire arise from vice. 
This is clearly a simplified version of the distinction in Nicomachean Ethics 5.8 between 
atychêmata, hamartêmata, adikêmata, and “being an unjust person” (1135a5–1136a5), trailed 
in summary form at 5.6, 1134a17–23: 
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν 
ἑκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτης ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ λῃστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ 
ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ ᾗ, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος. 
ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον οὐ κλέπτης, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε 
δέ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 
But since a person may commit injustice and not yet be unjust, what is it that 
distinguishes those unjust acts whose commission makes a person actually unjust in 
terms of each form of injustice, for example, a thief or a seducer or a robber? Or is this 
not what makes the difference? For a man may have intercourse with a woman knowing 
who she is, yet not from prohairesis at all, but rather under the influence of passion. So 
he commits injustice, but he is not an unjust man – not a thief, though he has stolen, not 
a seducer, though he has seduced, and so forth. 
One can actually commit an unjust act, and commit it intentionally, and yet still not be an unjust 
person; in order to be a thief or an adulterer a person must possess a settled disposition to 
choose the vicious act for its own sake, qua act of injustice. It is only in this last case that the 
agent acts with prohairesis. This means that if the act of hybris is to involve prohairesis, its 
dispositional aspect will be both much more substantial and much more particular than Fisher 
argued in 1992. It will demand more than a simple intention to dishonour another person 
(Fisher’s claim), because such an intention is possible even in cases where no prohairesis is 
present. Aristotle is consistent in his view that hybris depends on prohairesis; and if that is so, 
then hybris is – or implies – a form of vice.9 
 
2. Hybris is a form of particular injustice and so involves pleonexia 
Aristotle’s first expression of his view of hybris in Rhetoric 1.13 occurs, as we saw, in the 
context of a discussion of justice and injustice, and this already makes it clear that he sees 
hybris as a species of injustice: “in all such matters the issue is about being unjust or not being 
unjust” (Rhet. 1374a9–11). This is substantiated by explicit references to hybris as a type of 
injustice elsewhere – in the immediate context and elsewhere in the work.10 If hybris is a type 
of injustice, then the hexis from which it springs must be what Nicomachean Ethics Book 5 
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identifies as “particular injustice” (ἡ ἐν μέρει/κατὰ μέρος ἀδικία),11 and we should be able to 
find out more about it from that context. 
A crucial aspect of particular injustice is that, according to Aristotle, all its forms 
involve a kind of pleonexia, acquisitiveness or greed. This is a point upon which Aristotle lays 
considerable emphasis, first at 5.1, 1129a32–b11: 
δοκεῖ δὴ ὅ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ 
[ὁ] δίκαιος ἔσται ὅ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, 
τὸ δ’ ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τἀγαθὰ 
ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά, τινὶ δ’ 
οὐκ ἀεί. οἱ δ’ ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὔχονται καὶ διώκουσιν· δεῖ δ’ οὔ, ἀλλ’ εὔχεσθαι μὲν τὰ 
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθά. ὁ δ’ ἄδικος οὐκ ἀεὶ 
τὸ πλέον αἱρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ’ ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ 
μεῖον κακὸν ἀγαθόν πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ’ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ 
πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστι δ’ ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. 
Both the one who breaks the law and the pleonektês, the unfair [or ‘unequal’: anisos] 
person, seem to be unjust, so that it is clear that the law-abiding person and the fair 
person will both be just. The just, then, is the lawful and the equal [or ‘fair’, ison], and 
the unjust the illegal and the unequal [or ‘unfair’, anison]. Since the unjust person is a 
pleonektês, s/he will be unjust with regard to good things – not all good things, but 
those that are a matter of good and bad fortune. These are always good in the absolute 
sense, but not always for a particular individual. People pray for these and pursue them, 
but they shouldn’t; they should pray instead that the things that are good absolutely may 
be good for them too, but choose the things that are good for them. The unjust person 
does not, however, always choose the larger share: s/he actually chooses the smaller 
share of things that are bad without qualification; but because the lesser evil seems good 
in a way, and because pleonexia is of the good, s/he seems to be a pleonektês. What 
s/he is is unfair, for this includes and is common to both scenarios. 
The emphasis continues in the next chapter (1130a14–22): 
ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι γάρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 
περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας  μοχθηρίας 
ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μέν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ’ οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς 
εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι’ ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, 
πολλάκις κατ’ οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ 
γε τινά (ψέγομεν γάρ) καὶ κατ’ ἀδικίαν. 
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What we are investigating, however, is the particular justice which is a virtue, since, as 
we said, there is such a thing; and similarly with regard to injustice it is the particular 
sense that we are investigating. Here is a proof that it exists: in respect of the other vices 
the agent does wrong (adikein), but does not take more of anything, out of pleonexia 
(πλεονεκτεῖ δ’ οὐδέν) — for example, by throwing away one’s shield, from cowardice, 
or abusing someone, from bad temper, or not lending money, from meanness; whereas 
when one takes more, out of pleonexia, it is often not a matter of any of these vices, 
much less all of them, yet it is a matter of vice (since we blame it), i.e. injustice. 
It recurs in 5.6, 1134a32-4:12  
ἐν οἷς δ’ ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις (ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία), τοῦτο 
δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὑτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν. 
Where there is injustice (adikia), there is unjust action (to adikein), but where there is 
unjust action there is not always injustice: to act unjustly is to assign to oneself too great 
a share of things that are good without qualification and too small a share of things that 
are bad without qualification. 
It is important to be clear that all forms of particular injustice are forms of pleonexia. 
This is true even of injustice in distribution13 or of the corrective justice of the judge (5.9, 
1136b34–1137a4):14  
εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. ὥσπερ οὖν 
κἂν εἴ τις μερίσαιτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλέον ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ 
ἐπ’ ἐκείνῳ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν ἀλλ’ ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. 
But if a judge knowingly judges unjustly, he too is taking more [pleonektein], either of 
charis or of timôria. Therefore a judge who judges unjustly for these motives has more, 
just as if one were to share in the crime [to adikêma]; for in fact one who issues a 
judgement over a piece of land on that basis one gets not land but money. 
It is also important that pleonexia may focus on any of those goods that signify success or 
failure, good or bad fortune (εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, 1129b3). It thus covers desire not only for 
money, but also for timê, safety, and other things of that type (περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν 
ἢ εἴ τινι ἔχοιμεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, 1130b2–3).15 
At the same time, however, Aristotle’s use of the term pleonexia here is an element in 
a strategy, employed consistently in Nicomachean Ethics 5, of using terminology drawn from 
the material economy to construct models of distribution, exchange, and rectification in both 
material and non-material spheres. We see this in 5.5 (1132b21–1133b28) on “proportional 
equality” and the role of money in making commodities commensurable and in enabling future 
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exchange. But for our purposes it is especially relevant in three passages. The first is 
Nicomachean Ethics 5.2 (1130a32–b5). Here particular injustice is distinguished from general 
injustice and said to be about a form of profit (kerdos) that is not solely material: 
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ 
ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ’ ἣ μὲν 
περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τινι ἔχοιμεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, 
καὶ δι’ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἣ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.  
Thus it is clear that there is another sort of injustice besides general injustice, i.e. 
particular injustice, called by the same name because its definition is in the same genus; 
for both take effect in one’s dealings with others, but while particular injustice is 
concerned with honour or money or safety – or whatever term there may be that 
encompasses all these things – and motivated by the pleasure that derives from the 
profit [kerdos], general injustice is about all the things that the virtuous person is 
concerned with. 
The account that follows (in EN 5.4, 1132a9–19, 1132b11-20) of the arithmetic equality 
that is the subject-matter of rectificatory justice in transactions between individuals makes it 
clear that Aristotle is borrowing the notions of “profit” (kerdos) and “loss” (zêmia) from the 
sphere of voluntary economic exchange: 
ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ 
τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μή τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ 
ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ’ ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ κέρδος. 
ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν 
πλέον τὸ δ’ ἔλαττον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ’ ἔλαττον κέρδος, 
τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ 
ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. 
But [the judge] endeavours to make them equal by means of the loss [zêmia], taking 
away the profit [kerdos]. “Profit” is used in a general way in such cases, even if it would 
not be the proper word in some of them, for example in the case of an assailant, likewise 
“loss” in the case of the victim; but whenever the damage is measured, at any rate, the 
latter is called “loss” and the former “profit”. Accordingly, while the equal is a mean 
between more and less, profit and loss are at the same time both more and less in 
contrary ways, profit being more of the good and less of the bad and loss being the 
opposite; of these the equal, which we assert to be just, is, as we said, a mean, with the 
result that rectificatory justice would be the mean between loss and profit.  
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ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἥ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ τῆς ἑκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ 
μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ αὑτοῦ κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ’ ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς 
ζημιοῦσθαι, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν δέδωκεν ὁ 
νόμος· ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ’ ἔλαττον ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ <τὰ> δι’ αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὑτῶν 
φασὶν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον 
τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. 
These terms, “loss” and “profit”, come from voluntary exchange. For to have more than 
one's own is called making a profit, and to have less than one had at the start is called 
making a loss, as in buying and selling, and all other transactions in which the law has 
granted immunity; but when the result is neither an increase nor a decrease, but exactly 
what they had at the outset, they say they have their own and have made neither a loss 
nor a profit. Hence justice in involuntary transactions is a mean between profit and loss 
of a sort, namely having the same both before and after. 
Similarly, at 5.5 (1133b29–1134a13), justice is a mean between excess and deficiency, 
having more (pleon echein) and having less, and any act of injustice involves the agent’s having 
more and the victim’s having less:16 
τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται. διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι 
ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν τὸ δ’ 
ἔλαττόν ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τίς ἐστιν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις 
ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν· ἡ δ’ ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ’ 
ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ 
αὑτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἱρετοῦ πλέον αὑτῷ 
ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ’ ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, 
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἡ δ’ ἀδικία τοὐναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν 
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ 
ἔλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεώς ἐστιν, ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν 
τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον 
ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον 
ἀδικεῖσθαί ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν. 
 
What the unjust and the just are has been stated. From their definition it is clear that 
just behaviour is a mean between doing and suffering injustice, for the former is to have 
too much and the latter to have too little. And justice is a kind of mean – not in the same 
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way as the other virtues are, but because it is related to a mean, while injustice is related 
to the extremes. Αnd justice is that by which the just person is said to be capable of 
doing that which is just by prohairesis, and inclined, when distributing things between 
oneself and another, or between two others, not to give too much to oneself and too 
little to one’s neighbour of what is choiceworthy, and vice versa in the case of what is 
harmful, but what is proportionately equal; and similarly when one is distributing 
between two people. Injustice, on the contrary, is similarly related to that which is 
unjust, i.e. an excess or deficiency of something beneficial or harmful that is 
disproportionate. Therefore injustice is excess and defect, because it deals in excess and 
defect – in one’s own case, an excess of that which is beneficial without qualification 
and a deficiency of what is harmful, and in the case of others, though the result as a 
whole is the same, the deviation from proportion may be in either direction. In respect 
of the unjust act, having the lesser share is being wronged and having the greater share 
is doing wrong.  
These passages make it clear that these expressions are being used in an extended sense; 
at 1132b11–18, in particular, Aristotle makes the point that kerdainein and zêmiousthai are 
terms borrowed from the voluntary exchange of buying and selling goods, in which profit and 
loss are legitimate. The relevance of these terms to the sphere of particular justice that is 
Aristotle’s proper subject is that kerdainein is a name for having more (pleon echein) than one 
started with, while zêmiousthai means having less (1132b13–14). Kerdainein is the more 
specifically economic term, and pleon echein a more general expression, but still pleon echein 
is a quantitative notion, applicable to material exchange, that is being used to apply also in 
contexts in which the quantities concerned can be abstract and intangible.  
Pleon echein and pleonexia, then, can have both strict and extended senses. This 
explains why hybris and pleonexia can sometimes be distinguished in the Aristotelian corpus, 
as they are (for example) at Politics 5.2–3, 1302a38–b10: 
διὰ κέρδος γὰρ καὶ διὰ τιμὴν παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐχ ἵνα κτήσωνται σφίσιν 
αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρους ὁρῶντες τοὺς μὲν δικαίως τοὺς δ’ 
ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας τούτων· ἔτι διὰ ὕβριν, διὰ φόβον, διὰ ὑπεροχήν, διὰ 
καταφρόνησιν, διὰ αὔξησιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον δι’ ἐριθείαν, 
δι’ ὀλιγωρίαν, διὰ μικρότητα, διὰ ἀνομοιότητα. τούτων δὲ ὕβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα 
ἔχουσι δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αἴτια, σχεδόν ἐστι φανερόν· ὑβριζόντων τε γὰρ τῶν ἐν ταῖς 
ἀρχαῖς καὶ πλεονεκτούντων στασιάζουσι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τὰς 
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διδούσας τὴν ἐξουσίαν· ἡ δὲ πλεονεξία γίνεται ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ὁτὲ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν 
κοινῶν. 
For people are stirred up against each other by reason of profit [kerdos] and honour 
[timê], not in order that they may acquire them for themselves, as has been said before, 
but because they see others – in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly – claiming 
a larger share [pleonektountes] of them. Other causes are hybris, fear, excessive 
predominance, contempt, disproportionate growth of power; and in a different way 
bribing the electorate, slighting, pettiness, dissimilarity. Οf these, the power possessed 
by hybris and kerdos, and their mode of causation, is almost obvious; for when those 
in office show hybris and pleonexia, people engage in faction, both against each another 
and against the constitutions that offer the opportunity to do so; and pleonexia arises 
sometimes from the private and sometimes from the communal. 
Here timê and hybris (on the one hand) and kerdos (on the other) are two distinct causes of 
stasis, and pleonexia is (probably) concerned with property, whether private or communal.17 
The same distinction is made in a passage from the post-Aristotelian On Virtues and 
Vices (1251a30–36): 
ἀδικίας δ’ ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία, ἀσέβεια πλεονεξία ὕβρις. ἀσέβεια μὲν ἡ περὶ θεοὺς 
πλημμέλεια καὶ περὶ δαίμονας ἢ καὶ περὶ τοὺς κατοιχομένους, καὶ περὶ γονεῖς καὶ περὶ 
πατρίδα· πλεονεξία δὲ περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια, παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν αἱρουμένη τὸ διάφορον· 
ὕβρις δέ, καθ’ ἣν τὰς ἡδονὰς αὑτοῖς παρασκευάζουσιν, εἰς ὄνειδος ἀγαγόντες ἑτέρους, 
ὅθεν Εὔηνος περὶ αὐτῆς λέγει “ἥτις κερδαίνουσ’ οὐδὲν ὅμως ἀδικεῖ”. 
There are three forms of injustice [adikia] – impiety [asebeia], pleonexia, and hybris. 
Impiety is transgression with regard to divinities or the dead, as well as parents and the 
fatherland; pleonexia is transgression with regard to contracts, and involves taking the 
difference in a way that is contrary to desert; and hybris is a way of obtaining pleasure 
for oneself by insulting others, which is why Evenus says of it that “it makes no profit 
and yet does wrong” [adikein]. 
Though the definition of hybris in Rhetoric 2.2 does not explicitly make precisely this point, 
its emphasis on the fact that hybris involves seeking nothing more than the pleasure of the act 
itself is in some ways similar to the point made by the author of On Virtues and Vices.  
We can thus agree that hybris and material acquisitiveness are two different things, and 
that pleonexia is a common name for the latter. But the existence of the strict sense of pleonexia 
in no way rules out its use in an extended, non-material sense. And in fact that sense is also 
present even in the passage of the Politics quoted immediately above, for though that passage 
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begins by distinguishing timê and kerdos as motives, and ends by referring pleonexia solely to 
material goods, it also observes that people get worked up about timê and kerdos not because 
they want to acquire them for themselves, but because they see others exhibiting pleonexia in 
both those respects – διὰ κέρδος γὰρ καὶ διὰ τιμὴν παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐχ ἵνα 
κτήσωνται σφίσιν αὐτοῖς … ἀλλ’ ἑτέρους ὁρῶντες … πλεονεκτοῦντας τούτων (people are 
stirred up against each other by reason of kerdos and timê, not in order that they may acquire 
them for themselves …, but because they see others … claiming a larger share 
[pleonektountes] of them’ (1302a38–b2). Even in distinguishing profit and honour as motives, 
hybris and pleonexia as vices, this passage acknowledges that there can also be pleonexia of 
timê. This chimes with the argument of the wider context, that stasis arises from the perception 
of unjust treatment, with regard either to the equality that one is being denied or to the 
inequality or superiority to which one feels entitled (Pol. 5.2, 1302a24–34). Here pleonektein 
(a26) and pleon echein (a27–28) are used of all the objects of stasis, i.e. ‘kerdos, timê, and their 
opposites’ (a31–32).18 The account of particular injustice as pleonexia in the Nicomachean 
Ethics stands in a direct relation to this passage. 
I emphasize this especially because of Ryan Balot’s insistence that pleonexia in 
Aristotle – “especially in the Politics” – is “focused on power and material goods, rather than 
on honor”.19 This is wrong, because it fails fully to acknowledge the extended sense in which 
Aristotle uses the term pleonexia in the Nicomachean Ethics (as well as the presence of that 
extended sense elsewhere, for example in the Politics). It is wrong also because that extension 
of the term’s sense is not an unimportant or merely ad hoc expedient: it is central to Aristotle’s 
account of particular justice and injustice, to his conceptualization of honour as an important 
non-material good (one that he describes as the goal of civic life, EN 1.5, 1095b23, the greatest 
of external goods, 4.3, 1123b20–21), and to his understanding of hybris, not just in the Ethics, 
but elsewhere.  
But if Balot is wrong about the relation between honour, hybris, injustice, and the 
Nicomachean Ethics’ extended sense of pleonexia, it is even more significant that his approach 
also errs in driving far too great a wedge between honour and wealth, hybris and pleonexia (in 
its narrower, material sense), as factors in ethical and political behaviour. At several points in 
his book,20 Balot argues that “Aristotle’s separation of the terms” hybris and pleonexia – a 
position for which he cites my 1996 article on hybris – is typical of a progressive tendency to 
see material acquisitiveness and the pursuit of honour as alternative sources of motivation in 
the development of Greek political thought from the Archaic to the Classical periods.21 This is 
not my subject in this chapter, and so I cannot discuss it at length. But it seems to me that 
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Aristotle is thoroughly in keeping with earlier currents of Greek political thought in regularly 
expressing the conviction that the pursuit of wealth cannot be wholly dissociated from the 
pursuit of esteem and social status. We see this in the presentation of hybris as a failing of the 
rich in particular,22 but we also have Aristotle’s explicit word for it that power and wealth are 
regarded by some as choiceworthy precisely because people see them as a means to honour 
(EN 4.3, 1124a17–20):23 
αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ 
τιμᾶσθαι δι’ αὐτῶν βούλονται· ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τἆλλα. διὸ 
ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.  
For power and wealth are choiceworthy because of the honour they bring – at any rate, 
those who have them wish to be honoured on account of them. A person to whom even 
honour is a small thing will be indifferent to other things as well. Hence they [sc. 
megalopsychoi] are thought to be supercilious. 
It is unfortunate that Balot’s account obscures these links, especially because their 
existence constitutes an important continuity between Aristotelian and traditional Greek ethical 
and political thought (e.g. in connexion with the “archaic chain” that links wealth and good 
fortune to excess, greed, hybris, and disaster).24 But it is unfortunate also because it flies in the 
face of modern research in a variety of disciplines which, like Aristotle and like much 
traditional Greek thought, emphasizes that material prosperity is intimately related to issues of 
status and social comparison.25 Epidemiological and sociological studies, for example, suggest 
that the deleterious effects of inequality of wealth and income – at least in modern societies 
where absolute poverty is rare – are largely a function of the link between wealth and status, 
of what one’s wealth and the things one can buy with it say about one’s standing relative to 
others. There is substantial evidence to suggest that humans’ concern for fairness in the 
distribution of material rewards is conditioned not only by material concerns, but by the 
concern for status. The concern for fairness that typically manifests itself in the well-known 
“ultimatum game” shows that human beings’ attitudes to material gain and the distribution of 
material resources are conditioned by a sense of one’s own worth, by the notion that it would 
be beneath one’s dignity to accept an excessively unfair share, even of a windfall.26 We dislike 
excessive material inequality because of its unfairness. The unfairness in question is in itself 
already a matter of the discrepancy between outcome and desert. But we also resent inequitable 
distributions of wealth and income because those who benefit from them seem regularly to 
believe that greater material success is a mark of superior worth as an individual and a member 
of society; their greed for more encompasses status as well as wealth and power. Here again, 
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Aristotle shows himself well aware of the phenomenon that Balot obscures. Stasis, he writes 
(Pol. 5.1, 1301a28–35), is typically driven by mistaken notions of equality and inequality: 
democrats seek to extend the equality they enjoy by virtue of their free-born status and claim 
equality in all other respects, while for oligarchs the converse is true – being unequal in material 
wealth they believe themselves to be unequal absolutely. Thus the rich seek to pleonektein (ὡς 
ἄνισοι ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν, τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον, 34–35). The rich already have more 
in material terms (κατ’ οὐσίαν γὰρ ἄνισοι ὄντες ἁπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι, 32–33); 
the other qualities in which they (unjustly) pleonektein are not material. 
 
3. Honour, wealth, good fortune, and hybris 
To take this further, let us return to hybris and the vice that it expresses. We should first notice 
how closely the characteristics of particular injustice in the Nicomachean Ethics match those 
of hybris in the Rhetoric. This kind of injustice can be manifested in the distribution of goods, 
but also in the context of “involuntary transactions” in which an agent creates an unfair 
inequality between himself and a patient in respect of some good, whether by stealth or by 
force (EN 5.2, 1130b30–1131a9): 
τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ’ αὐτὴν δικαίου ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς 
διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας 
(ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἓν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς 
συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν 
ἑκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δ’ ἀκούσια, ἑκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὠνὴ δανεισμὸς ἐγγύη 
χρῆσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις (ἑκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων 
τούτων ἑκούσιος), τῶν δ’ ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρμακεία 
προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμὸς 
θάνατος ἁρπαγὴ πήρωσις κακηγορία προπηλακισμός. 
One kind of particular justice, and of that which is just in that respect, lies in the 
distribution of honour, money, or the other things that are divisible among those who 
share in the constitution (for in these things people may differ in having equal or 
unequal shares). The other kind is that which is corrective and operative in transactions. 
Of this there are two parts, for transactions may be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary 
transactions are things like selling, buying, lending at interest, pledging, lending 
without interest, depositing, letting for hire; they are called voluntary because the 
beginning of these transactions is voluntary. Of involuntary transactions some are 
furtive, such as theft, seduction, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, 
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assassination, perjury; others are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, 
robbery with violence, maiming, abusive language, insult. 
Thus particular injustice can be concerned with honour, requires a specific victim, and can be 
manifested in words or in deeds, by physical assault (aikeia, 1131a8) or by verbal insult 
(kakêgoria and propêlakismos, 1131a9),27 i.e. ‘doing or saying things whereby the sufferer 
incurs aischynê’ (Rhet. 1378b23–24). And just as the hybristês is motivated by desire for a 
particular kind of pleasure in the Rhetoric, so particular injustice seeks the pleasure that comes 
from the kerdos (δι’ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, EN 1130b4), the profit at another’s expense 
which is characteristic of the pleonexia that particular injustice involves.28 Like hybris (οἱ γὰρ 
ἀντιποιοῦντες οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται, Rhet. 1378b25–26) particular injustice also 
requires the initiation of wrongdoing, and is not found in retaliation (ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε καὶ τὸ 
αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, 1138a20–22).29 Both hybris and particular injustice, then, 
involve taking the initiative in exalting oneself at the expense of others, for no other motive 
than the pleasure of the offence itself. Hybris meets the criteria for vicious action in the fullest 
sense – it springs from a settled disposition to choose the vicious course for its own sake, in so 
far as it is pleasant.30 
The fact that Aristotle thinks of hybris as a form of particular injustice also helps explain 
why he assumes that hybris must always have a victim – all forms of injustice are necessarily 
πρὸς ἕτερον,31 and, as a form of particular injustice, hybris must occur in “involuntary 
transactions” involving two parties. In addition, Aristotle’s discussion of “involuntary 
transactions” focuses on cases where correction will be forthcoming from a judicial source; 
similarly in the Rhetoric the reference to hybris in 1.13 is specifically related to the needs of 
the forensic orator (see esp. 1374a7–9). Adikein in Greek, we remember, means “commit an 
offence” as well as “be unjust”. 
At the same time, hybris is not just a way of treating other people. As a way of treating 
other people that connotes vice and requires prohairesis, it requires a specific sort of motivation 
rooted in a developed state of character that leads people to enjoy unfairly pressing their own 
claims in the face of the legitimate claims of others. Aristotle’s emphasis on the agent’s attitude 
to his own honour is both apparent in the definition in Rhetoric 2.2 and necessary if hybris is 
to be a form of injustice, of the pleonexia that seeks more for oneself at the expense of others. 
The comparative nature of the concepts of pleonexia and particular injustice in Nicomachean 
Ethics Book 5 isolates a fundamental feature of hybris – that as a way of going wrong about 
one’s own claim to honour it inevitably involves going wrong about the claims to honour of 
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others (and vice versa).32 This relational element of comparison and complementarity is also a 
fundamental feature of the concept of honour, in Aristotle, in Greek, and in general.33 
Even though hybris is, for Aristotle, always a particular way of treating another person, 
it is not the nature of the act or the effect on the honour of the patient that makes an act hybristic, 
but the motive, the prohairesis that expresses a developed state of character. Unlike other 
authors,34 Aristotle does not explicitly refer to this state of character as hybris,35 but still the 
disposition is not nameless: it is the state by virtue of which a person is called a hybristês. To 
be a hybristês is not just to be liable to commit hybristic acts; hybristic acts must be defined as 
those that the possessor of a particular hexis would perform. Since the hexis from which hybris 
springs is that of injustice in its narrower sense, this in itself allows us to pin down the typical 
characteristics of the hybristic agent to a certain extent. But other contexts provide further help. 
Our best evidence comes in a handful of passages in which Aristotle discusses hybris 
as typical of particular kinds of character. The discussions of pity and fear in Rhetoric 2.5 and 
2.8, for example, consider not only the dispositions that give rise to these emotions, but also 
those that do not. Both pity and fear require the notion that we are vulnerable to misfortune 
(1382b29–30, 1385b16–17); by contrast, those who believe that their current good fortune 
renders them invulnerable to vicissitude are disposed not to pity or to fear (1382b33–1383a3, 
1385b19–21, 29–31), but, because they are hybristai (1383a2) and “in a hybristic condition” 
(1385b30–31), to hybrizein (1385b21). The hybristic disposition (diathesis) from which 
concrete expressions of hybris spring entails a blind over-valuation of oneself caused by the 
experience or the illusion of prosperity and good fortune.  
The sketches of the characteristics of the young, the rich, and the powerful in the 
Rhetoric and Politics also consistently attribute the hybris of those groups to their failure to 
form an appropriate conception of their own worth in relation to the worth of others. The 
characterization of the young at Rhetoric 2.12 (1389a2–b12), for example, stresses their 
naiveté, their inexperience of misfortune, and their acute attachment to timê. When hybris 
enters this picture at 1389b7–12, it is with specific reference to acts of insult or mockery (their 
acts of injustice tend more towards hybris than to petty wrongdoing, and they are witty, since 
wit is educated hybris, b7–12),36 but these acts spring from a particular type of character, one 
that lacks the experience that should set limits to self-confidence and self-assertion. 
Being hybristic and arrogant is likewise one of the characteristics of the rich (2.16), 
since the acquisition of wealth creates the illusion that we possess all good things, and this is 
the basis of the disposition of being hybristai and hyperêphanoi (1390b32–1391a2): 
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τῷ δὲ πλούτῳ ἃ ἕπεται ἤθη, ἐπιπολῆς ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἅπασιν· ὑβρισταὶ γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, 
πάσχοντές τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως τοῦ πλούτου (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔχοντες ἅπαντα τἀγαθὰ οὕτω 
διάκεινται· ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος οἷον τιμή τις τῆς ἀξίας τῶν ἄλλων, διὸ φαίνεται ὤνια ἅπαντα 
εἶναι αὐτοῦ). 
The characters which accompany wealth are plain for all to see. The wealthy are 
hybristai and arrogant – something happens to them as a result of the acquisition of 
wealth (for they are so disposed as to think that they possess all good things; and wealth, 
as it were, is a valuation of the worth of everything else, which is why it seems that one 
can buy everything with it).37 
As a result of this error, the rich have a false idea of their own worth and a misplaced confidence 
in their own good fortune (1391a1–14, especially 13–14: καὶ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, ἀνοήτου 
εὐδαίμονος ἦθος <ἦθος> πλούτου ἐστίν, “in a nutshell, the character that belongs to wealth is 
that of a lucky fool”).  
The Politics also recognizes the tendency of the excessively fortunate to become 
hybristai and commit hybris (4.11, 1295b6–11): 
ὑπέρκαλον δὲ ἢ ὑπερίσχυρον ἢ ὑπερευγενῆ ἢ ὑπερπλούσιον <ὄντα>, ἢ τἀναντία 
τούτοις, ὑπέρπτωχον ἢ ὑπερασθενῆ ἢ σφόδρα ἄτιμον, χαλεπὸν τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθεῖν· 
γίγνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ 
μικροπόνηροι λίαν, τῶν δ’ ἀδικημάτων τὰ μὲν γίγνεται δι’ ὕβριν τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν. 
For a person who is exceedingly beautiful or strong or nobly born or rich, or the 
opposite –  i.e. exceedingly poor or weak or lacking in honour – it is difficult to follow 
reason; for the former tend rather to become hybristai and large-scale villains, while 
the latter tend too much to petty crime and low-level villainy. For the cause of all acts 
of injustice is either hybris or malice. 
Again, the specific reference of the noun, hybris, is to a type of unjust act (b10–11), but this is 
one that springs from a mistaken belief that my particular good fortune entitles me to a greater 
share of honour than it should. Similarly, at 7.15, 1334a25–28 we read that war compels men 
to be just and to show sôphrosynê, whereas enjoyment of good fortune and leisure in time of 
peace makes them hybristai (ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἡ δὲ 
τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ’ εἰρήνης ὑβριστὰς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον). War fosters a 
disposition of modesty and self-restraint, prosperity and peace one of over-confidence and self-
assertion. To possess the disposition that is necessary for hybris is thus to have a particular 
mistaken view of who you are, how things are going for you, and how likely this is to continue. 
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In the first of these Politics passages (4.11, 1295b8–9) it is the absence of reason that 
explains the mistaken attitude to good or bad fortune. The same point is made at EN 4.3, 
1124a26–b6:  
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς 
ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ’ ἀγαθῷ 
ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ 
ὑπὸ τινῶν· κατ’ ἀλήθειαν δ’ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ᾧ δ’ ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον 
ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. οἱ δ’ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς 
μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ 
ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ 
γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥᾴδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ 
οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ’ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι 
πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς 
δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ’ ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν 
γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. 
But instances of good fortune [eutychêmata] also seem to conduce to megalopsychia; 
for the well-born and those who are powerful or wealthy are thought worthy of honour, 
because they are in a position of superiority, and everything that is superior in some 
good is more highly honoured; so that even such things [sc. eutychêmata] make people 
more megalopsychos, because they are honoured by some people. But in reality only 
the good man is to be honoured, but anyone who has both [virtue and good luck] is 
thought more worthy of honour. Those who possess goods of that sort without virtue, 
on the other hand, are not justified in thinking themselves worthy of great things, and 
are not properly called megalopsychoi, since these things cannot exist without complete 
virtue. Those who possess goods of that sort also become supercilious and hybristai; 
because without virtue it is not easy to bear good fortune properly; being unable to bear 
it, and thinking themselves superior to the rest, they despise them, and act at random. 
They imitate the megalopsychos without being really like him, and do this in those 
aspects in which they are able: they cannot perform the actions that he performs out of 
virtue, so they just look down on other people. For the megalopsychos is justified in 
looking down on other people — his estimates are correct; but the majority do so at 
random. 
The megalopsychos has the right attitude to timê and the goods for which people receive timê; 
others who enjoy the same external advantages, but lack virtue, are wrong in thinking 
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themselves worthy of great things and should not be called megalopsychoi. These people 
instead become supercilious (hyperoptai) and hybristai, because without aretê it is hard to deal 
appropriately with good fortune; unable to bear their good fortune and thinking themselves 
superior they despise others and do whatever they please. In this they resemble the 
megalopsychos, but his contempt for others is rational where theirs is not. To be a hybristês 
one’s contempt for others must be based on a mistaken conception of one’s own worth and a 
failure to distinguish luck from desert. I think we all know such people; sometimes it seems as 
if entire sectors of society consist of them alone. 
Aristotle’s definitions of hybris presuppose a reference to a source of motivation 
which provides the crucial criterion for differentiating a hybristic act from an apparently 
similar non-hybristic act. Pace Fisher (1992), these dispositional factors are not mere 
concomitants or conditions, but characteristics of the hexis that is necessary for hybris. To be 
a hybristês is not just to possess a drive, tendency, or intention to commit hybristic acts, but 
to entertain a misguided and inflated conception of oneself and one’s place in the world. The 
hexis involved in being a hybristês, then, is a vice, in Aristotle’s strict sense of the term. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Hybris is fundamentally about honour; but honour is an inclusive concept for Aristotle, as in 
Greek in general. Rather like “demeanour” and “deference” in Erving Goffman’s celebrated 
account of social interaction,38 timê presupposes bidirectional negotiations of esteem and 
self-esteem. Though Aristotle himself generally prefers to see timê as the esteem one receives 
from others (typically using the term axia for the agent’s subjective claim to that esteem),39 
ordinary Greek uses timê for both the expression of esteem and for the quality that attracts it. 
The timê that Poseidon says was shared equally between each of the three divine brothers, 
Zeus, Hades, and himself, in the Iliad (15.185–93) consists in the prerogatives and the 
freedom of action that each exercises in his specific domain; the timê or timai that are 
allocated by Zeus to the various divinities in Hesiod’s Theogony have a similar sense.40 
‘Prerogative’, ‘status’, or ‘office’ are regular meanings of the term – the timai that were the 
offices of the Athenian state both expressed the esteem in which the individual was held and 
constituted a claim to that esteem.41 This is a sense that Aristotle himself confirms in Politics 
3.10, 1281a31–2;42 indeed it is sharing in timai – in the sense of prerogatives, privileges, and 
offices – that he describes as the mark of a citizen at Politics 3.5, 1278a35–36 (λέγεται 
μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν).43 The bidirectionality (of demeanour and deference, 
claims and their recognition) thus presupposed in ancient Greek concepts of honour is 
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apparent in the way that aidôs focuses on the honour of both self and other.44 But it is there, 
too, in Aristotle’s notion of hybris as a form of pleonexia, for the pleonexia that is entailed by 
particular injustice in the sphere of honour involves precisely the failure to strike the 
appropriate balance between one’s own honour and that of others. It is very important indeed 
that Aristotle believes that there is an economy of esteem,45 and even more so that he thinks 
that this is an economy that can, in theory, be justly regulated and operated. If there can be 
injustice in the negotiations, transactions, and distributions of honour, then individuals have 
rights to respect and esteem, just as they have rights to their property. These are aspects of 
Aristotle’s thought which scholarship has barely begun to explore.46 
One other conclusion that we might draw from Aristotle’s handling of the concept of 
hybris is that the timê on which hybris rests also implies a great deal about a person’s sense 
of his or her place in the world. Hybris is about how one projects oneself and one’s own 
claims to others’ respect, as well as about one’s failure to show proper respect for others. But, 
over and above that, in everything that Aristotle says about the failure of the hybristês to 
realize that he is fallible, vulnerable, and subject to the same shifts in fortune as afflict 
everyone else, we see notions that reach very far back in traditional Greek thought, notions 
that define the human condition in a world of change and uncertainty.47 
As we saw, Aristotle’s discussion of hybris in the Rhetoric reflects the needs of the 
forensic orator. This account is deepened in the Nicomachean Ethics’ discussion of hybris as 
a form of particular injustice. Both of these discussions reflect the fact that, in Athenian law, 
hybris was a form of injustice, something that requires its actualization in word and deed.48 
One (but only one) aspect of this is the effect that hybris has on the honour of the victim. But 
in making it clear, in these same discussions, that hybris is also about the honour of the 
perpetrator, as well as in the emphasis that he places on the links between hybris and 
mistaken attitudes to good fortune, Aristotle also encompasses a much wider tradition of 
ancient Greek ethical and political thought, and successfully captures the inclusivity of hybris 
as a subjective, vicious disposition as well as an inappropriate way of treating others.49 
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1 Translating τὸ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν (A; Ross, Kassel), rather than τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λύπειν as in some later MSS 
(and earlier editions). I follow Cope 1877, ii.17 and Fisher 1992, 8 in the interpretation of the phrase, μὴ ἵνα τι 
γένηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο, ἢ ὅτι ἐγένετο. 
2 Cairns 1996, discussing Fisher 1992. 
3 οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξεν πάντως ὕβρισεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἕνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκεῖνον ἢ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι. For 
corroboration of this in forensic oratory, see e.g. the well-known passage at D. 21.72: 
οὐ γὰρ ἡ πληγὴ παρέστησε τὴν ὀργήν, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἀτιμία· οὐδὲ τὸ τύπτεσθαι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἐστὶ δεινόν, καίπερ ὂν 
δεινόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐφ’ ὕβρει. πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιήσειεν ὁ τύπτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὧν ὁ παθὼν ἔνι’ οὐδ’ ἂν 
ἀπαγγεῖλαι δύναιθ’ ἑτέρῳ, τῷ σχήματι, τῷ βλέμματι, τῇ φωνῇ, ὅταν ὡς ὑβρίζων, ὅταν ὡς ἐχθρὸς ὑπάρχων, ὅταν 
κονδύλοις, ὅταν ἐπὶ κόρρης. ταῦτα κινεῖ, ταῦτ’ ἐξίστησιν ἀνθρώπους αὑτῶν, ἀήθεις ὄντας τοῦ 
προπηλακίζεσθαι. οὐδεὶς ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῦτ’ ἀπαγγέλλων δύναιτο τὸ δεινὸν παραστῆσαι τοῖς 
ἀκούουσιν οὕτως ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τοῦ πράγματος τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ τοῖς ὁρῶσιν ἐναργὴς ἡ ὕβρις 
φαίνεται. 
4 1.13, 1373b33–1374a15: ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἢ 
ἀγνοοῦντος καὶ ἄκοντος ἢ ἑκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος. περὶ μὲν οὖν 
θυμοῦ ῥηθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες εἴρηται πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ’ 
ὁμολογοῦντες πολλάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ περὶ ὃ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν 
ἀλλ’ οὐ κλέψαι, καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλ’ οὐ μοιχεῦσαι, ἢ κλέψαι μὲν ἀλλ’ 
οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι), ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐ δημοσίαν, ἢ διειλέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλ’ 
οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τί κλοπή, τί ὕβρις, τί μοιχεία, ὅπως ἐάν τε ὑπάρχειν 
ἐάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα δεικνύναι ἔχωμεν ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον. ἔστι δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ 
ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἢ μὴ ἄδικον [ἡ] ἀμφισβήτησις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ 
τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν, οἷον ὕβρις καὶ κλοπή. 
5 See EN 3.2–3 (cf. EE 2.10–11, MM 17–19) and 6.2. Ross 1949, 200 distinguishes a “technical sense” of 
prohairesis (relating to means) in EN 3.2 and 6.2 from its supposed use elsewhere to mean “purpose” (relating 
to ends), but see Sorabji 1980, 202–204. For various views on prohairesis (none fundamentally incompatible 
with the argument of this paper), see (e.g.) Kenny 1979, 69–107; Sorabji 1980, 201–5; Hutchinson 1986, 88–
107; Sherman 1989, 79–94, 106–116; Broadie 1992, 78–82, 232–60; Broadie and Rowe 2002, 42–46; Pakaluk 
2005, 129–136; Taylor 2006, 85–87, 150–155, 158–159; Frede 2011, 19–30; Bobzien 2014; Lorenz 2009, esp. 
184–192; Merker 2016; Müller 2016; Price 2016. 
6 Follows deliberation (EN 1112a15–1113a14, EE 1226a20–b30, 1227a5–18), but not necessarily actual 
deliberation (EN 1117a17–22). It is a deliberative desire (EN 1113a10–11, 1139a22–b5, EE 1226b2–20), a 
choice of τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη (EN 1112b11–1113a14, 1113b3–4, EE 1226a7–13, 1226b9–20, 1227a5–18), the telos 
being set by boulêsis (EN 1113a15–b3, EE 1226a13–17, EE 1227a28–31, 1227b37–1228a2; cf. EN 1142b28–33 
on euboulia). 
7 Prohairesis requires a hexis (EN 1139a33–5), and it is excellence of character that makes the prohairesis right 
(EN 1144a20; cf. 1145a4–5, EE 1227b34–1228a2). Virtue requires prohairesis (EN 1106a3–4, 1110b31, 
1111b5, 1117a5, 1127b14, 1134a17–23, 1135b25, 1139a22–6, 1144a13–22, 1145a2–6, 1157b30, 1163a22, 
1178a34–b1, EE 1227b1–5), as does vice (EN 1110b31, 1135b25, 1146a32, 1146b22–3, 1148a4–17, 1150a19–
21, 1150b29–30, 1151a6–7, 1152a4–6). Both virtue (EN 1105a32,1144a13–20) and vice involve choosing the 
action for its own sake in the light of one’s view of eudaimonia (e.g. 1127a26–b17). Thus praise and blame 
focus not on the act but on the prohairesis (EN 1111b6, EE 1228a2–18). 
8 That the treatment of justice and injustice is concluded by a discussion of epieikeia (1.13, 1374a26–b23; cf. 
EN 5.10, 1137a31–1138a3) is another sign that the framework of the EN is being applied. 
9 To be sure, ‘intention’ (or ‘design’) is the translation of prohairesis preferred by Merker 2016, 272–82, but her 
discussion shows full awareness of the specifics of the concept in Aristotle’s ethical theory. 
10 E.g. Rhet. 1373a34–35 (people readily commit injustices ὅσα αἰσχύνονται οἱ ἀδικηθέντες λέγειν, οἷον 
γυναικῶν οἰκείων ὕβρεις ἢ εἰς αὑτοὺς ἢ εἰς υἱεῖς); 1389b7–8 (καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν [sc. οἱ νέοι] εἰς ὕβριν, 
οὐ κακουργίαν); 1391a18–19 (καὶ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν [sc. οἱ πλούσιοι] οὐ κακουργικά, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν 
ὑβριστικὰ τὰ δὲ ἀκρατευτικά, οἷον εἰς αἰκίαν καὶ μοιχείαν). Cf. also [Pl.] Def. 415e12; [Arist.] De Virt. 
1251a30–6. 
11 See in general EN 5.1, 1129a32–b11, 5.2, 1130a14–b18, 5.2–4, 1130b30–1132b20, and passim). 
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12 Cf. pleon echein (vel sim.) at 1131b19, 1132b3, 1132b13, 1133b13, 1133b31, 1136b16, 1136b18, 1136b26, 
1138a30; also 1133b30–1134a13 in general on the excess taken by the unjust agent and the deficiency imposed 
on the victim. 
13 EN 5.2, 1130b30–1131a9, discussed below. 
14 Something that Williams (1980, 192–193) describes as ‘a desperate device’ and ‘nonsense’, expressing the 
view that “There must be something wrong in extending pleonexia to cover someone’s getting more of this kind 
of thing.” Be that as it may, it is undeniable that Aristotle does indeed so extend it. 
15 Cf. EN 9.8, 1168b15–23: there is a form of pleonexia involved in (vulgar) philautia that is similarly 
concerned with timai and pleasure, as well as with money.  
16 Cf. again 5.2, 1130b30–1131a9 in general (discussed below). 
17 See Miller 1995, 282–283. 
18 Cf. Miller 1995, 295. 
19 Balot 2001: 64 n. 21, endorsed by Mantzouranis 2012: 51 n. 41.  
20 Balot 2001: 92 n. 105, 106 n. 12. Cf. p. 104: “it is significant that later classical thinkers such as Aristotle 
emphasized the connection between hubris and greed far less than the associations between greed and 
distributive justice”. But if hybris is a type of pleonexia for Aristotle that distinction collapses. 
21 Balot is thus a ‘progressivist’ in his approach to honour: for criticism of this approach in general, see Cairns 
2011a; for Balot’s version of it across his oeuvre, see Canevaro 2018a. For the alleged chronological 
development in the distinction between wealth or power and honour as motives, see e.g. Balot 2001: 92–94 on 
Solon, 102–106 on Herodotus, 157–159 on Thucydides. Throughout his book, Balot consistently begs the 
question in assuming material senses for objectives and motives that often encompass the non-material (esp. 
honour and status). There are too many examples to cite, but see e.g. pp. 87 (geras in Sol. 5.1-6 W and in 
Homer), 110-111 (on Hdt. 7.149.3), 138–139 (on pleonexia and philotimia at Thuc. 3.82.8), 158–159 (on Thuc. 
3.45.4-5). Here he writes (p. 159): “For Thucydides what is primary is the desire to have more, as a conceptual 
category in its own right. This desire was associated with other ideas, notably hope and overconfidence after 
success, but in itself desire was the fundamental drive behind Athenian imperialism.” In a footnote on the same 
page (n. 56), he goes on: “Fisher’s attempt (1992, 401–11) to view the Sicilian expedition as an act of hubris 
can be justified in that the expedition would not have been undertaken without feelings of over-confidence and 
without a desire to inflict humiliation on the Sicilians in order to demonstrate Athenian superiority, but, as I will 
show, the primary thrust driving the expedition was Athenian desire to get more.” But this presupposes that 
“desire” for “more” must be intrinsically and exclusively material; the evidence that Balot himself cites gives no 
warrant at all for this, but in fact supports the opposite view. The question is always ‘more of what?’(See also 
Hdt. 7.16α, in n. 23 below.)  
22 E.g. in the definition of hybris in Rhetoric 2.2, quoted above (διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι ὑβρισταί· ὑπερέχειν 
γὰρ οἴονται ὑβρίζοντες, 1378b28–29); cf. the discussion of the characteristics of the rich at 2.16, 1390b33–34 
(ὑβρισταὶ γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, πάσχοντές τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως τοῦ πλούτου). 
23 But if the rich seek wealth in order to obtain esteem, so, in turn, those who seek esteem do so in order to 
convince themselves that they are good: EN 1.5, 1095b26–28; cf. 4.3, 1123b35, 8.14, 1163b3–4. 
24 See esp. Solon 4. 34–35 W, with Fisher 1992: 72; cf. 206, 213, 221, 236ff. For the traditional linkage of 
‘thinking big’, hybris, and pleonexia, see e.g. Artabanus’ representations of Xerxes’ plan to invade Greece at 
Hdt. 7.10δ–ε, 7.16α, 7.18.2–3 (with Cairns 1996, 13–15). Balot (2001, 106) would have us believe that this 
presentation reflects “older” currents of thought in Herodotus that sit alongside newer ones (in which “greed is 
considered rather in terms of distributive unfairness”) that prefigure Aristotle’s “separation” of hybris and 
pleonexia. Again, a question is begged: why do we care about unfairness? 
25 See Brennan and Pettit 2004; Marmot 2004; Layard 2005, esp. 41–48, 150–153; Wilkinson 2005; Frank 2007; 
Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Dorling 2010. 
26 See e.g. Thaler 1988; Nowak, Page, and Sigmund 2000. The claim that we share this trait with other primates 
(Brosnan and De Waal 2003; Brosnan, Schiff, and De Waal 2005) has been disputed (Bräuer, Call and 
Tomasello 2006; Jensen, Call, and Tomasello 2007), but there is no doubt that the link between rank and 
psychophysical well-being, at least, is as strong in primates and other mammals as it is in human beings 
(Wilkinson 2005, 71–75, 87–89, 163, 268–271).  
27 According to Ammonius (De adfin. vocab. diff. 20; cf. Fisher 1992, 53 n. 52) hybreis are distinguished from 
aikeiai by the fact that propêlakismos is necessary for the former; on propêlakismos and hybris, cf. Fisher 1992, 
44 n. 31, 48, 93, 107. 
28 Cf. Irwin 1988, 426, 429 and 624 nn. 4–6. The kerdos (the inequality) that particular injustice creates, the 
disparity in honour that hybris creates, and the pleasure of being unjust/hybristic for its own sake are thus 
intrinsic motives (as opposed to the extrinsic motive that might lead one to commit a superficially similar act of 
injustice as a means to some further or different end). This is to say that the inequality (the kerdos that is the 
inequality in honour and the pleasure that comes with it) that hybris creates is not an extrinsic, further end, but 
the intrinsic aim of the hybristic act, qua expression of the hexis of particular injustice. 
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29 Cf. Rhet. 1379a30–35 on (reactive) anger as a response to (gratuitous) hybris; also 1402a1–3, where physical 
violence only qualifies as hybris when the assailant is the one who started it. 
30 This also answers to a typical feature of hybris in ordinary usage, in which to say that someone acted “not out 
of hybris, but . . . [for some further motive]” is to deny acting “just for badness/for the hell of it”, as a 
demonstration of one’s insolent disregard for law or convention; see (e.g.) Lys. 7.13; cf. Thuc. 4.95.8, Xen. 
Anab. 5.5.16, Dem. 21.181–182; Fisher 1992, 49, 98, 103. 
31 EN 5.1, 1129b25–1130a13; cf. 1130b20; 1130b1–5. 
32 See in greater detail Cairns 1996. 
33 See Cairns 1993, 2011a. 
34 See Fisher 1992, 125, 242, 281, 493. Arist.’s account of hybris thus resembles his discussions of aidôs in not 
acknowledging that hybris, like aidôs, can be the name of a disposition; see Cairns 1993, 393–431. 
35 The only instance I can find in the Arist. corpus of hybris used as the name of a character trait is in the post-
Aristotelian Oec. (1344a35–b1). 
36 καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὕβριν, οὐ κακουργίαν. καὶ ἐλεητικοὶ διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστοὺς καὶ βελτίους 
ὑπολαμβάνειν (τῇ γὰρ αὑτῶν ἀκακίᾳ τοὺς πέλας μετροῦσιν, ὥστε ἀνάξια πάσχειν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτούς), καὶ 
φιλογέλωτες, διὸ καὶ φιλευτράπελοι· ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπελία πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις ἐστίν. Contrast the old at 2.13, 
1389b13–1390a28, esp. 1390a17–18: καὶ τἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν. 
37 We should note the affinity between this passage and the account of oligarchic motivation in Pol. 5.1 (section 
2 above, ad fin.). 
38 See Goffman 1967. 
39 Ε.g. EN 4.3, 1123b23–24, Pol. 3.5, 1278a19–20, Rhet. 1.7, 1365a7–8. 
40 Ηes. Th. 71–74, 112, 203–204, 421–422, 452, 462, 490–491, 881–885, 892–893; cf. Hdt. 1.118.2, 2.53.2. 
41 For timê as ‘office’ at Athens see (e.g.) Hdt. 1.59.5, Pl. Ap. 35b1–3. Cf. Hdt. 2.65.3, 6.66.3 (priesthood); 
3.34.1 (king’s wine-pourer); 1.91.1, 4.155.2, 4.162.1–2; 7.8α.2, 7.104.1 (kingship).  
42 τιμὰς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχόντων δ’ αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους (for we 
say that offices are timai, but if the same people are always in office the others are necessarily without timê). Cf. 
timê as the office/dignity of a king in Pol. 5.10 (1310b36, 1313a13). 
43 I think this is not just about offices (pace Riesbeck 2016, 193). Cf. (e.g.) Hdt. 4.145.4, where timai are the 
privileges and prerogatives that come with membership of the citizen community at Sparta. 
44 Cairns 1993. 
45 Anticipating, at least in outline, Brennan and Pettit 2004. 
46 But see Rabbås 2015. For (occasional and undeveloped) thoughts that support the conclusions in the text 
above (as far as the Politics is concerned), see Miller 1995, 101, 158–159, 266, 281–283, 295–296, 303; 
disappointingly little in Inamura 2015 (but see pp. 202–203) or Riesbeck 2016. 
47 This is a complex of thought that I have discussed before, in Sophocles (Cairns 2006), in Bacchylides (Cairns 
2011b), and in Greek literature more generally (Cairns 2014). Cf. also Cairns 2013, 2016.  
48 On the authenticity of the law on hybris as paraphrased in Aesch. 1 and D. 21 (though not of its text as given 
at Aesch. 1.16 or at D. 21.47), see E. M. Harris in Canevaro 2013, 224–231. For an account of the law’s 
provision regarding hybris towards slaves that is fully in keeping with the argument of this paper, see Canevaro 
2018b. 
49 There is an account of timê and wealth as external goods in Aristotle’s ethical thought, and of the relation 
between Aristotle and traditional Greek thought on these matters, in Mantzouranis 2012, but it has (at pp. 81–
83) relatively little to say about hybris and does not pursue the affinities between Aristotelian and traditional 
thought on the interplay of wealth/prosperity, status, and fortune in the ways that human beings fail in their 
efforts to achieve eudaimonia. 
